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Let us start with the assumption that the global elite should act together to secure climate 
change mitigation and adaptation, at least to the extent of protecting fundamental human 
interests. By the ‘global elite’ I mean most people in more developed countries and the rich 
minority in less developed ones. This claim has been defended philosophically as a shared or 
‘weakly collective’ duty or as the putative duty of a putative group: a duty to organize as 
necessary to achieve some collective result (Cripps 2013: 48-82; Isaacs 2011: 144-53). This 
chapter asks what it means for individuals.2  
It is frequently claimed that individuals should promote collective climate action (Johnson 
2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). I have elsewhere defended this as the individual’s primary 
climate justice duty, on the basis of fairness, efficiency and effectiveness (Cripps 2013: 140-
55).3 However, this leaves the individual little the wiser as to what she should actually do. Her 
options range from what we might call ‘pure’ promotional actions, designed to bring about 
institutional change – voting, campaigning, marching, starting and signing petitions, writing 
to politicians, writing in newspapers, and so on – to lifestyle changes as part of wider 
movements, such as veganism, or investing in renewable technology. One individual cannot 
do everything. So how does she choose? 
This chapter both defends and challenges my response to this: the Cooperative 
Promotional Model (CPM).4 It understands promotional duties in a broad sense (beyond 
merely promoting governmental action) and accounts not only for a duty to perform ‘pure’ 
promotional actions (such as campaigning or voting) but also to cut one’s own carbon 
footprint. Having outlined the model and set it in philosophical context, the chapter will 
                                                     
1 Earlier versions of this argument were discussed at the Moral Philosophy Seminar, University of Oxford, the 
Climate Justice Beyond the State Workshop, University of New South Wales, the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, University of St Andrew, the Political Theory Colloquium, Goethe University, Frankfurt and 
the Edinburgh University Political Theory Group. I gratefully acknowledge the constructive feedback on all 
occasions, as well as helpful comments from the editors of this volume. 
2 Were a fair, efficient, effective collective scheme in place to fulfil the shared or weakly collective duty, each 
individual should (obviously) play her part. But this is not the case.  
3 See Cripps (2013: 115-39; Forthcoming) for my rejection of a number of arguments for a priority-taking duty 
to minimise one’s own carbon footprint (individual harm, fairness, Kantian or virtue ethic-based). I previously 
distinguished between mimicking, direct and promotional duties (Cripps 2013: 116). Here, the three are 
subsumed within the overall promotional end.  
4 For an introduction to this model for a broader audience, see Cripps (Forthcoming). 
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highlight three key challenges and indicate briefly why a modified CPM is worth pursuing 
despite these. 
 
Introducing the Cooperative Promotional Model 
 
The CPM requires individuals to fulfil the following duty. I present it here in a preliminary 
format; by the end of the chapter, a slight adjustment will have become necessary. 
 
Cooperative Promotional Duty (CPD) 
Act together with motivated others, so far as possible at reasonable cost to oneself, to promote fair, 
efficient, effective global-level progress on climate change mitigation and adaptation. 
 
I will return later to the ‘reasonable cost’ condition. ‘Acting together’ is intended to include a 
range of possibilities: strongly collective action via some institutional structure, less formal 
joint or collective action (with each individual thinking of herself as contributing to a collective 
result), or reliable coordination. A small-scale rescue case can provide illustration. A number 
of experienced climbers approaching several tourists in need of rescue across a hillside might 
be the local mountain rescue group following an established collective decision-making 
process or they might be a collection of individuals not previously constituting a group. In the 
latter case, they might act intentionally together by deliberating and determining between 
them who will rescue each, or they might coordinate in some mutually obvious way without 
the need for prior discussion (for example, each rescuing the person closest to her). 
In the climate change case, the situation is complicated by the global-level nature of the 
challenge. Two distinctions must be drawn. The first is between the global elite taken as a 
whole, who incur the shared or weakly collective duty, and the subset actually motivated to 
fulfil it, whom we can call The Motivated. Note that this model focuses on the duty to co-
operate with other motivated agents but does not thereby assume that the long-term 
collective scheme will involve only The Motivated. Quite the contrary, since this would be 
unfair. I will return to this point. 
It is not currently feasible for The Motivated to act as a collective. The group has global 
span, but overlaps with states and institutions (rather than neatly encompassing them) and 
has no decision-making structure of its own. Nor is it feasible for an individual to facilitate 
such collective action alone.5 Thus, applying the CPM requires drawing a second distinction: 
between The Motivated as a whole and the many smaller motivated groups or potential 
groups ((P)SMGs) within it who are or could easily become capable of collective action. These 
range from small, often informal collections of individuals through to bigger scale 
movements, such as the vegan movement, or more or less formally structured collectives, 
such as NGOs. Achieving progress on fair, efficient, effective mitigation and adaptation will 
involve more or less strongly collective action by these (P)SMGs and more or less reliable 
coordination across them. 
Against this background, there are four steps to fulfilling the CPD.  
 
                                                     
5 Barring, possibly, some exceptionally situated or talented individuals, whom I will exclude for the purposes of 
this chapter. 
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Step 1  
The individual must establish what effective coordination and distribution of individual 
contributions across the different (P)SMGs would look like. This depends on the chances of 
success of each effort (that is, whether each group achieves its own end), and how they fit 
with one another in terms of the overall aim (which, recall, is taken to be fair, efficient, 
effective global level progress on mitigation and adaptation).  
With regard to the latter, the actions of different (P)SMGs can be complementary or the 
reverse. They can be complementary in the straightforward sense of focusing on different 
aspects of the challenge, for example developing renewable or adaptation technology, or 
pursuing either institutional or widespread lifestyle change. However, they can also be 
complementary in a different sense: keeping different options open while it remains unclear 
which has the potential to succeed. For example, different technologies might be 
simultaneously researched or different political options explored, evaluated and promoted.  
However, there might be insufficient resources to pursue or promote all these possibilities 
adequately. Then, the activities of different (P)SMGs could conflict and, in combination, set 
back the overall end of fair, effective, efficient global progress. Suppose, for example, there 
are insufficient resources adequately to promote two major adaptation projects. Conflict can 
also arise more directly between the goals of different (P)SMGs, even if all are ultimately 
concerned with climate justice. Compare ‘sustainable intensification’ (Budolfson 2018) with 
organic, wildlife-friendly agriculture combined with much lower meat and dairy 
consumption.6 There is a fine line between different groups pursuing different options 
complementarily (as it is not yet clear which is most feasible) and actively campaigning against 
one another in a way which risks setting back the overall end. Moreover, previously 
complementary subgroups might come into conflict as further evidence about feasibility 
emerges, or the demand for resources increases. All this is important to calculating how 
different (P)SMG efforts can optimally combine, but also generates potential challenges for 
the model, to which I will return.  
 
Step 2 
The individual must then ascertain where to devote her own effort, depending on the 
following factors: 
- Her own skillset and that of other motivated individuals. 
- The costs to herself and to motivated others of acting within different (P)SMGs. This is 
relevant because of the reasonable cost threshold: the costs of different potential 
cooperative actions will determine how much an individual is able to contribute before 
reaching that threshold, and so where she can be most effective. 
- Her own position and influence, and that of motivated others.7 This is not just about 
occupying certain political or institutional roles, although that is important: the actions of 
the US president, the Pope or the CEO of a FTSE 100 company are more likely to bring 
about political change or the actions of others than those of most individuals. It is about 
influence in more general terms. Consider for example the potential for celebrities to 
                                                     
6 It might be contended that ‘sustainable intensification’ cannot be a genuine part of pursuit of climate justice 
because it is an oxymoron. However, I set this aside for the purposes of the example. 
7 For an earlier discussion see Cripps (2013: 162-64). 
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promote social or even political change.8 The point is simply that more effort is necessarily 
required of these individuals (though it might be of political or corporate leaders, because 
of the special liability of certain institutions for harm). Rather, more might be achieved in 
certain areas by certain individuals at an equivalent level of personal cost. 
- The needs and salience of needs of different (P)SMGs. This follows from Step 1. 
 
Step 3 
Having worked out the optimum allocation of effort across the different (P)SMGs, the next 
step for the individual is to estimate and adjust for likely deviation from that optimum 
allocation by other motivated individuals. This might result from bias towards certain 




Finally, the individual is required to be flexible. This is not some one-off decision to which she 
afterwards unwaveringly adheres. Rather, she must adjust her behaviour and her cooperative 
actions as either the facts or her awareness of them changes. For example, it might become 
apparent that one option is technically infeasible or another has the momentum to succeed.  
 
To illustrate the process, consider the following analogy: 
 
Islanders 
50 people are stranded on a small island where a dangerous storm is reliably forecast for the next day. 
They have no adequate boats. Another 20 people are on the mainland in a position to attempt a rescue. 
All are motivated to help. This might be approached in two ways: 
R1. Using one big boat. This is most likely to be effective but will not be possible in certain (unlikely but 
possible) weather conditions. 
R2. Using several smaller boats. This is riskier and less likely to succeed but is the only option in the above 
weather conditions. 
 
Step 1 is for the individual to work out how the different subsets within Mainlanders could 
most fairly and efficiently coordinate for the rescue. Some might focus on different aspects 
of preparing for the rescue: equipping the boat(s), preparing to act as crew, and so on. If there 
are sufficient Mainlanders and resources to prepare for R1 and R2, a subgroup should focus 
on each, reliably coordinating to keep both options open. If this is not the case, two rival 
groups each pursuing one of the two options would be collectively irrational.  
In Step 2, the individual estimates where she and others best fit in this effort, according to 
the needs of the different (P)SMGs, as well as her skills and those of others (are they 
experienced sailors or trained engineers?), her/their position or influence (is she particularly 
popular, or valued as a leader in some other sphere?), and the costs of taking on different 
roles. (At the extreme, it might be unreasonably demanding for a breastfeeding mother or 
someone suffering from acute sea-sickness to take active part in the rescue.) However, 
communication difficulties or widespread bias among others might mean that an individual 
should deviate from the allocation implied by (1) and (2) in order to contribute most 
                                                     
8 Actor-activists Emma Thompson and Leonardo di Caprio are obvious examples. UK Premier League footballer 
Hector Bellerin also recently used a radio interview to highlight the importance of action on climate change 
(BBC 2019). 
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effectively to the overall end (Step 3). Suppose there is no time for a formal decision making 
process to assign some Mainlanders to R1 and others for R2, but it would be optimal to 
prepare for both. An individual whose own skills would best fit her for mending and preparing 
the big boat might see that most others are gravitating that way, and instead prepare to crew 
a small boat.  
The last step is for the individual to adjust to changes. For example, if the weather becomes 
clearly settled for long enough to use the big boat, the individual would shift her efforts from 




Having outlined the CPM, I have now to provide a normative justification for it. As noted 
above, this chapter assumes a shared or weakly collective duty or, as it has alternatively been 
defended, a putative duty of a putative group (Cripps 2013: 48-82; Isaacs 2011: 144-53). This 
is a duty to act together as necessary to prevent climate change from undermining central 
human interests. It has been defended as a positive duty, grounded in a collectivised principle 
of beneficence, a duty to organize to secure basic rights, or a duty to protect the vulnerable 
(Cripps 2013; Held 1970; Shue 1980). It has also been defended as a negative duty to act 
together to prevent the harm resulting predictably from the combination of individual actions 
or from participation in harmful patterns of action (Ashford 2006; Cripps 2013; Gardiner 
2011b; Kutz 2000). In each case, there is moral reason for some group or potential group to 
achieve something together and this gives rise to individual reasons to act, including to 
promote collective-level progress (Isaacs 2011: 140-54). The duty to render any collective 
action fair and efficient is grounded separately in obligations to one’s fellow duty-bearers 
(Cripps 2013: 143-50). 
Given the focus on promoting a particular state of affairs, the natural justification for an 
individual’s course of action would be a consequentialist one (Pettit 1991: 340).9 However, 
the CPM by no means corresponds to a straightforward maximising consequentialism, and 
certainly does not collapse into utilitarianism. The moral salience of the outcome being 
pursued – fair, efficient, effective global-level climate change mitigation and adaptation –  is 
ultimately grounded in the normative priority of protecting basic rights or interests. 
Moreover, the CPM incorporates a demandingness limit in terms of individual costs and 
relationships, and is compatible with some deontological constraints. A later section will 
elaborate on this. 
With these caveats in mind, let me turn to the version of consequentialist reasoning 
underlying the CPM. Simple rule-consequentialism will not justify the CPD, because of the 
partial compliance objection. In this context, the individual rule-consequentialist would 
calculate what all duty-bearers should be doing and play what would be her own part in that. 
However, individuals know that many unmotivated persons and groups in the global elite 
won’t do their part (call these The Unmotivated). Accordingly, it would better promote global 
climate action if The Motivated attempted to motivate others, or ‘took up the slack’ by doing 
more themselves, than if they attempted to contribute to a combination of actions which will 
                                                     
9 To put it another way, I am effectively recommending that those motivated by collective harm or 
beneficence considerations should ‘think like consequentialists’. This is in contrast to Dale Jamieson (2010) 
who argues that rule-consequentialists should make themselves think like virtue theorists (to motivate 
themselves to ‘go green’). For my critique of his argument, see Cripps (2013: 124-27). 
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not in fact be forthcoming. The CPM bypasses this problem by focusing on what individuals 
can achieve by acting together with motivated others. (To reiterate, in drawing this distinction 
between The Motivated and all duty bearers, I am not assuming that in any long-term global 
level collective action The Motivated, taken as a whole, must pick up all the slack. I will come 
back to this.) 
An alternative consequentialist approach, avoiding the partial compliance objection, 
would be a modified rule consequentialist reasoning on which the individual calculates how 
everyone in The Motivated should act to secure the overall result and does her ‘bit’ of that. 
However, this also fails to justify the CPD, for two reasons. Firstly, unlike the CPM, this 
approach neglects the possibility that those who want to contribute optimally to combined 
and collective action might fail to do so effectively. This could result from communication 
issues, lack of mutual knowledge, or bias by some motivated individuals.10 For example, 
individuals might tend towards projects local to themselves, even if these are less central to 
the overall goal. Given all this, it could be more effective for the individual to cooperate with 
some others to compensate for likely deviations. 
Secondly, any viable model of individual climate duties must make space for strongly 
collective action or fail to capture all viable and necessary means of achieving progress. 
Consider the difference between combined emissions cuts resulting in mitigation gains and 
the development of (say) a global adaptation fund, which requires strongly collective action. 
(Even in the former instance, strongly collective action will often be fairer and more efficient 
(Cripps 2013: 143-50).) The CPM allows explicitly for cases in which the best course of action 
requires acting intentionally as a collective. However, in such cases it becomes impossible or 
pointless simply to ‘do one’s part’ acting as an isolated individual.  
Clearly, then, the CPM can only be grounded by a model on which what it is right for an 
individual to do depends partly on how others act in cooperative situations; which makes 
space for more or less strongly collective action rather than simply coordination or 
combination of individual actions; and which adjusts for failure by even motivated others to 
act according to the optimal scheme. The obvious question is then: is the CPM justified by 
act-consequentialist reasoning? 
The answer is less obvious: it can be, but needn’t. In fact, progress can be made on 
justifying the CPM by considering alternative ways of responding to an important challenge 
to the idea of individual promotional duties (or individual consequentialism more generally). 
This is the no difference challenge. While it is clear what we should do as a collective and clear 
that if there were a collective-level response to be part of, the collective duty could indeed 
mediate individual duties, the situation is relevantly different (or so the objection goes) when 
there is no duty-fulfilling collective-level scheme.11 Whether via ‘pure’ promotional activities 
such as voting or marching or cutting individual emissions (to which I will return below), an 
                                                     
10 There is evidence of bias in terms of environmental goals more general, for example the tendency to care 
disproportionately about the fate of ‘cute’ species in protecting biodiversity (Small 2011, 2012). 
11 It is important to distinguish between the collective level, where the moral argument can be backwards or 
forwards-looking, and individual level. Mediated by the collective obligation, the individual has a forward-
looking or indirect reason to pursue collective progress on climate change, via subset endeavours. Thus, the 
puzzle is the familiar one of making sense of why an individual should add her effort to a worthwhile group effort 
where it will make no (perceptible) difference (as with, for example, Derek Parfit’s Principle of Group 
Beneficence (1984: 76-83)). 
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individual’s actions will make no difference to whether global-level progress is made on 
climate change mitigation or adaptation.12  
One response to this appeals to expected consequence reasoning: to the chance of one’s 
individual contribution triggering a significant collective-level change (Broome 2019; Hiller 
2011; Kagan 2011). In terms of individual emissions cuts, the idea is that there are thresholds 
of emissions at which harms get worse, and the individual, in emitting, runs the risk of causing 
such a threshold to be cut. More generally, the point is that an individual’s actions have a 
non-trivial probability of causing the global elite more closely to approximate fulfilment of its 
collective duties. On this interpretation, act-consequentialist reasoning justifies the CPD. 
Calculating what action would have the best expected consequences, in terms of bringing 
about fair, effective, efficient action on climate change, would require completing steps (1) 
to (4) above.13  
However, it remains contested whether there are collective action cases where threshold 
reasoning does not apply, and whether the climate case is one of these (Kingston and Sinnott-
Armstrong 2018: 178-81; Nefsky 2011). If so, an alternative justification for the CPD can be 
found in a recent account which detaches causal significance from difference-making (Nefsky 
2017). On this, an individual has moral reason to contribute to some combined or collective 
effort so long as the following hold: it remains uncertain whether the worthwhile outcome 
will be achieved, part of what determines whether or not it will be achieved is whether 
enough individuals act in the way the individual is considering acting, and it is still uncertain 
whether enough individuals will so act. The individual would thus be a non-superfluous part 
of the cause of a worthwhile event. To put it another way, she would help to bring it about. 
If this argument convinces, individuals can have moral reason to act in non-threshold 
collective action cases. But that does not make it a moral duty to do so (Nefsky 2017: 2744-
45). There are many such potential endeavours from which an individual could choose, even 
in the context of promoting fair, efficient, efficient collective action on climate change. The 
CPM fills out the process of choosing between them, according to the moral salience of the 
different aims, the relative salience of their need for the individual’s type of actions and their 
likelihood of being under or oversubscribed.14 The point is not to reduce this to expected 
consequence calculation: rather the individual is motivated by being part of the ‘herself-and-
others’ who could, for example,  rectify the balance given general deviation from optimal 
coordination.  
I doubt whether this can be called ‘act-consequentialism’. Indeed, an advantage of this 
model –one particularly suited to the CPM – is that it is designed for determining long-term 
individual patterns of action and does not require the individual to assess each act on a case 
by case basis (Nefsky 2017: 2765). However, what ultimately matters is not whether the CPM 
can be fitted into a particular terminology but whether it can be justified philosophically, 
within broader moral framework with which this chapter began. This I hope to have 
demonstrated. 
                                                     
12 That is not to say that the objection is equally strong with respect to ‘pure’ promotional actions (Cripps 
2013: 147). 
13 On this reading, (2) and (3) might be combined into a single step: effectively, the individual works out how 
she could best approximate the combination of actions identified in step (1), and so optimally bring about 
progress on climate change given the likely errors of motivated others. 
14 An alternative moral reason for participating in collective action is fairness-based: the individual should 
avoid seeking to make an exception of herself, equivalent to free riding in collective self-interest cases (Cullity 
2019). However, the individual still needs to determine which collective efforts are most morally salient and 
which she has a duty to be part of.  
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Individual emissions cuts 
 
With this in mind, let us briefly consider how fulfilling the CPD might involve cutting one’s 
own carbon footprint. This both acts as an example of the CPD in action, and demonstrates 
how the model can incorporate the individual emissions cuts which are sometimes consistent 
as entirely separate, and potentially rival, to so-called ‘pure’ promotional duties.  
Firstly, emissions cuts can play a promotional role, especially if they are made as part of a 
collective effort with motivated others. They can enhance the progress of social movements, 
for example the vegan movement, by incentivizing others to reduce their own carbon 
footprint. They can also serve to promote institutional change, either via social impetus or by 
acting as a ‘signal’ of willingness to accept regulatory change (Lawford-Smith 2016). Secondly, 
coordinated or collective actions to reduce emissions through combined lifestyle choices can, 
at a big enough scale, contribute to mitigation. Individuals can be part of this. 
There is an apparent tension between signaling for institutional change and for social 
movement change, which makes it more likely that the latter will be required by the CPD. It 
has been argued that an individual ‘signal’ must come at significant cost if it is to be taken as 
a meaningful guarantee of willingness to accept institutional changes such as higher prices 
for fossil fuels (Lawford-Smith 2016: 324-25). Such costly changes may be unreasonably 
demanding for some. However, lifestyle changes (such as becoming vegan, cycling, or 
holidaying by train) are more likely to be imitated by other individuals if they are presented 
as low cost, even beneficial or enjoyable.15 Since some ‘green’ lifestyle choices are arguably 
beneficial to the individuals themselves, they could play this role in promoting social 
movements, all the within an SMG of signalers. Moreover, even such low-cost changes could 
promote, if not top-down political change, at least some institutional change at an arguably 
equally influential level: corporate and economic change. This in turn can promote further 
lifestyle changes, as any individual costs of doing so fall. (Consider how plant-based products 
have become increasingly available as the number of vegans and flexitarians increase, in turn 
facilitating a further lifestyle shift (Hancox 2018).) 
Finally, thinking purely in terms of contribution to the harm done by climate change – 
rather than participating in combined or collective action to prevent such harm – one’s 
individual emissions arguably have some moral significance. However, the reasons for such 
cuts (whether rationalized in terms of expected consequences or helping to reduce harm) 
must be weighed up against other possible consequences available through cooperative 




As I have stressed, the CPM is not consequentialist ‘all the way down’. The duties it entails 
are pro tanto. The CPD also incorporates a demandingness limit. This section will briefly 
elaborate on both of these considerations. 
                                                     
15A study of another environmentally beneficial diet change (eating insects) found that neither the 
environmental benefits nor the health benefits were as persuasive as taste or trendiness (Berger et al. 2018). 
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Firstly, fulfilment could permissibly be constrained by some other moral duties, for 
example the individual no-harm principle or certain special duties, such as the to care for 
one’s severely disabled partner.16 Fulfilling the CPD might also come into conflict with other 
duties of global justice, such as aiding the current poor. I acknowledge this whilst leaving open 
either of two possible responses: allowing for such duties to take priority sometimes, for 
some individuals, or widening the scope of the CPM to apply to global justice more generally. 
The individual would use the four-step process to determine where to allocate her own 
efforts within that broader context. However, given the urgency and pervasiveness of the 
climate emergency, mitigation and adaptation would still be salient collective aims.17  
Secondly, the CPD’s ‘reasonable cost’ condition limits the sacrifices an individual can be 
expected to make, in terms of her own interests, projects and relationships. Broadly 
interpreted, this also would rule out some negative impacts on those closest to the individual, 
such as her children. I have not specified what the demandingness threshold is and cannot do 
more, here, than gesture in that direction. However, one reasonable line of thought starts 
from the widely shared moral principles governing individual action: the no-harm principle 
and the principle of beneficence (Mill 1859: 14; Singer 1972: 231). Given the anthropogenic 
nature of climate change, perhaps individual climate justice duties should be considered in 
line with the former, thereby putting the ‘reasonable cost’ threshold very high (Broome 2012: 
57; Cripps 2013: 11-12). However, this is disputed (Cripps 2013: 157; Fragniere 2018). Even if 
the stringent demandingness threshold applied in instances of strongly collective harm, there 
is a morally relevant difference in control between cases where the actions of individuals 
aggregate predictably to cause serious harm, and those where a group is acting intentionally 
as a group (that is, as a moral agent in its own right), with harm a foreseeable consequence.  
One might turn instead to the CPD as positively derived and so to the notion of ‘significant 
cost’, borrowed from the moderate principle of beneficence (Singer 1972: 231). I have 
elsewhere interpreted this as serious, even if temporary, interference with a central human 
interest (Cripps 2013: 13-14). This would, for example, rule out an individual having to take 
on a debilitating but temporary illness, break a leg, or be separated even for a few weeks from 
their young children.  
I do not think this can be rejected as too stringent. As in the negative case, appeal might 
be made to the difference between individual beneficence cases (for example, ‘Anne can pull 
Bob out of the water at relatively low cost to herself’) and cases such as this one, where the 
individual does not have sufficient control over the situation to be sure of bringing about the 
desired result. However, in the context of positive duties it would be a mistake to assume that 
less sacrifice is required of individuals simply because of the capacity for action (or inaction) 
by others. There is not space to go into the interesting and important questions around partial 
compliance and slack-taking here, so I will simply refer to one compelling recent argument 
(Karnein 2014), according to which the behaviour of other duty-bearers can change the 
content of an individual’s duty, but not the demandingness limit. Indeed, up to that limit, an 
individual might be required to do more than she would otherwise have done because of the 
failure of others to act. 
So far, so reasonable. However, this remains an undertheorized area in climate ethics (one, 
moreover, in need of interdisciplinary input). For example, one might question whether 
extrapolating from small-scale principles is the right way to assess demandingness at all, in 
                                                     
16 I have elsewhere elsewhere rejected the view that individual harm reasoning gives a direct, priority-taking 
individual duty to eliminate one’s own carbon footprint (Cripps 2016, Forthcoming). 
17 See also Cripps (Forthcoming). 
 10 
the face of the climate emergency. Given extreme global and intergenerational urgency, 
perhaps climate justice duties are radically more demanding than I have suggested: more akin 
to what individuals have previously been expected to sacrifice in a national emergency such 
as war. 
It is sufficient to leave the issue open for the purposes of this chapter, with the placeholder 
above provisionally in place. Even if individuals only had a duty to promote climate justice up 
to the point of fairly modest sacrifice (Fragniere 2018), they would need a way of deciding 
what to do up to that limit. The CPM provides that. The same would apply if the duties were 
much more demanding than I have suggested. Moreover, even a low threshold for 
demandingness would require a great deal more of affluent individuals than most of us 
currently achieve. 
 
Three challenges for the Cooperative Promotional Model 
 
The first challenge facing the CPM (Epistemic Challenge) is as follows. Recall how much 
information the individual has to acquire and process before taking action. She must assess: 
the chances of success of different (P)SMGs’ project, their fit with one another, her own and 
others’ skillsets, costs, position or influence and relevance to the aims of different (P)SMGs. 
She has also to adjust for the degree to which she can expect others to distribute efforts 
optimally. Her ability to rely on her own estimates will depend on the extent and reliability of 
her knowledge regarding the likely actions of others, and the degree of communication 
possible with others, including across (P)SMGs. The CPM does not require individuals to 
undertake all this no matter what the cost to herself: this would conflict with the discussion 
above. But there is a concern that the motivated individual may not be able to do anything 
within the limits of reasonable demandingness, because even gathering the information to 
decide how to act would take her beyond the limit. 
A further challenge (Conflicting Views Challenge) results from differences of opinion within 
The Motivated. The discussion above not only implicitly treated the size of The Motivated as 
fixed (which both this and the following challenge will question): it also implicitly assumed a 
single scale of progress towards fair, efficient, effective action on climate change, on which 
all motivated individuals agree and which provides a universal measure for progress. In 
practice, this isn’t the case. By definition, The Motivated agree on some key moral starting 
points: the intergenerational and global injustice of climate change threatening central 
human interests, and the need to respond to that (broadly speaking) fairly, efficiently and 
effectively. However, motivated individuals differ on precisely what counts as a ‘fair’ collective 
effort. Differences also result from adherence to moral values beyond the shared points 
above, with implications for the degree and understanding of ‘efficiency’ sought by 
individuals.  
For example, some will attach moral significance to the flourishing of non-human 
individuals and species;18 others attach religious significance to certain ways or life or parts 
of the world. These increase the likelihood of conflict between SMGs. For example, the UK’s 
                                                     
18 It might seem problematically anthropocentric to debate the place of non-humans or ecosystems in these 
determinations purely on the basis of individual humans happening to value them. I accept that. This paper 
prioritises protection of basic human interests, as an uncontroversial moral imperative. However, it is arguable 
that protecting non-humans from serious harm should take moral priority over some other ends 
acknowledged here (even, arguably, fairness). This would significantly complicate the model.  
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Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) supports climate action in general but opposes 
most tidal barrages and lagoons, as well as some windfarms, because of damage to wildlife 
(RSPB 2016). Some otherwise motivated individuals may in practice be inflexible to the point 
of either not being motivated to pursue collective progress on climate change if this comes at 
the cost of some other moral value important to them (thereby reducing the size of The 
Motivated), or playing ‘chicken’ with other SMGs by continuing to pursue one otherwise 
unpopular option even at the risk of undermining overall progress. This also exacerbates the 
Epistemic Challenge, since the motivated individual will have to factor all this into her 
reasoning even if she is not so conflicted herself. 
Finally, The Motivated is only a subset of the global elite (Challenge of the Unmotivated). 
As already stressed, fulfilling one’s cooperative promotional duty does not mean bringing 
about long-term global-level climate action which imposes all the burdens on The Motivated. 
While there is a moral case for ‘taking up the slack’ within the limits of demandingness (Cripps 
2013: 157-60; Karnein 2014; Roser and Hohl 2011), there is an important difference between 
working with motivated others to get progress going and assuming that long term The 
Unmotivated will remain off the hook.  
Recall that the morally required long-term end is fair, effective, efficient global-level 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. The global elite owe it to the victims of climate 
change to secure an effective end to climate injustice and to one another to do it fairly and 
efficiently (Cripps 2013: 143-50; Karnein 2014). Given the need for global level mitigation, it 
would be inefficient and very possibly ineffective to attempt to protect basic interests from 
climate change, long-term, without the participation of many of those currently in The 
Unmotivated.19 Moreover, agents best placed to take action and most responsible for it 
would carry a lower burden than almost any reasonable conception of fairness would require 
(Caney 2010; Page 2012; Shue 1999).  
Given this, the situation facing the motivated individual is complicated in a way which 
exacerbates both the previous challenges. The Motivated need to get The Unmotivated on 
board, whether by persuasion or institutional reform to require participation. (Both would 
effectively increase the size of The Motivated.) Failing that, they must find alternative ways 
of imposing a fair share of burdens on The Unmotivated (Caney 2016).20 However, it will most 
likely be impossible to achieve full participation, or even fully fair burden-sharing. Thus, some 
long term slack taking will be required (within collective demandingness limits). The three 
ends of fairness, efficiency and effectiveness will come apart, and The Motivated must choose 
between them. 
Now recall the Conflicting Views Challenge. Persuading members of The Unmotivated to 
join collective action, or responding adequately to the non-ideal situation wherein they 
remain unmotivated, may well require sacrificing other moral views, for example by damaging 
certain species, landscapes or ecosystems.21 (By ‘other’ I mean moral views beyond the 
shared adherence to basic justice and some level of fairness.) The individual must also include 
a whole additional set of factors into her decision-making process, such as potential or skills 
to influence The Unmotivated. This, again, exacerbates the Epistemic Challenge. 
                                                     
19 Stephen Gardiner (2011a: 95-98) makes this point in relation to major polluter states. 
20 Simon Caney (2016) identifies six possible responses to non-compliance with climate justice duties: 
increasing compliance, imposing burdens on non-compliers, sacrificing other moral ideas, reassigning 
responsibility, reassigning burdens to third parties, or adjusting the target (e.g. to allow a temperature rise of 
more than 1.5°C). 
21 The third best response to non-compliance, according to Caney (2016: 38). 
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Conclusions, resolutions – and a final puzzle  
 
This chapter has outlined the CPM and explained it philosophically. It has also raised three 
significant challenges. Despite these, I consider the model worth preserving. This final section 
will briefly explain why, and acknowledge a last, related puzzle. 
The Epistemic Challenge is not unique to the CPM. It applies to any model of moral duties 
requiring the agent to compare the consequences of different patterns of action in a complex 
scenario extending across time and space. In practice, approximation is necessary, combined 
with some division of labour. Individuals might begin by promoting the establishment of 
groups specifically tasked with comparing the effectiveness of different approaches.22 
Alternatively, they might rely on existing SMGs to do the due diligence on how they can best 
coordinate. Each individual could then estimate which (P)SMGs her skills best fit her for, with 
approximate adjustments insofar as she should reasonably be aware of wide-scale bias.23  
Sufficient agreement is likely among those actually committed to fairness (as opposed to 
using the term as a cover for, say, grandfathering ambitions) for the first component of the 
Conflicting Views Challenge – differing views over fairness – not to be a limiting factor for 
individuals determining how to act.24 However, the CPM needs amending in light of the 
second aspect of the Conflicting Views Challenge and the Challenge of the Unmotivated. As 
the previous section acknowledged, long-term full fairness is implausible given the attitude 
of at least some members of The Unmotivated. Given the different views and values upheld 
within The Motivated (a tension exacerbated by the need to respond to the (in)action of The 
Unmotivated), it is also unlikely to be optimally efficient in terms of securing basic justice.  
I therefore suggest the following: 
 
Amended Collective Promotional Duty 
Act with motivated others, in so far as possible at reasonable cost to oneself, so as best to promote 
effective progress on global level climate change mitigation and adaptation as fairly and efficiency as 
feasible. 
 
This significantly modifies the original CPD by acknowledging the fact that, in practice, The 
Motivated may find full fairness, efficiency and effectiveness to be incompatible. In 
prioritizing the former – actually avoiding severe climate harms – over fairness and efficiency, 
the amendment is in line with arguments made extensively elsewhere. Protecting 
fundamental human interests or basic rights ultimately takes priority over other (otherwise 
                                                     
22 Compare the various Effective Altruist calculators available to those looking to save most lives with their 
charitable donations. 
23 This might seem similar to satisficing consequentialism (Hurka 1990; Rogers 2010; Slote and Pettit 1984). 
The CPM already advocates one aspect of satisficing insofar as it incorporates a demandingness limit, but I am 
not advocating satisficing in the sense of knowingly accepting a suboptimum outcome when a better one is 
(reasonably) within one’s reach. Rather, individuals must approximate to make the fulfilment of the duty at all 
achievable within the limits of demandingness. 
24 Despite ongoing debate over details, there is general philosophical consensus that the global elite should 
take on the greatest burdens of mitigation and adaptation (Caney 2010; Page 2012; Shue 1999). 
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morally important) considerations such as fairness across duty bearers (Cripps 2013: 157-60; 
Roser and Hohl 2011).25  
This amendment allows the CPM provisionally to move beyond the challenges. However, 
it also prompts a final philosophical dilemma which I acknowledge here but cannot fully 
resolve. The previous section raised the danger of conflicting moral values as though they 
were features of other motivated agents, of which the individual carrying out her calculations 
needed to be aware. But, in practice, almost all motivated persons have moral values beyond 
the shared commitment to protecting fundamental interests threatened by climate change. 
We must therefore ask how far an individual can permissibly be guided by hers in determining 
how she promotes mitigation and adaptation. Suppose, to use the earlier example, she is a 
bird lover. Can such considerations legitimately allow her to deviate from maximum 
efficiency, if that would dictate promoting tidal lagoons for renewable energy?  
Consider three alternatives. (1) An individual’s (reasonable but comprehensive) moral 
values should not make any difference to fulfilment of the CPD. She should act only according 
to justice and efficiency (her skills and the needs and salience of different (P)SMGs) in 
determining where to allocate her efforts. (2) The individual must not support efforts liable 
actively to undermine collective progress (for example, actively campaigning against an 
otherwise feasible approach). However, she can lend her support to a less directly related 
area of climate action rather than actively promote a course she deems morally wrong. For 
example, the bird lover might focus on adaptation aid rather than campaign against tidal 
lagoons. (3) An individual can campaign for the route to collective progress on climate change 
that she deems morally preferable (so long as it is compatible with fair collective action) right 
up to the point where a rival scheme is adopted by collective consent. 
My own inclination is for option (2). Option (3) gives insufficient priority to protecting basic 
justice by permitting individuals to participate in action likely to slow progress towards it. 
Option (1) has the appeal of similarity to the Rawlsian requirement that the individual 
consider only the narrow political liberal conception of the good when acting as a citizen 
(Rawls 1993: 212-94). However, there is a distinction between being forbidden to undermine 
collective legislation which permits activities incompatible with one’s own comprehensive 
values, and a moral duty to promote such legislation. This would arguably be too demanding, 
so long as there are other options collectively available which would protect the fundamental 
interests at stake. Suppose for the sake of argument that so-called ‘sustainable 
intensification’ were the lowest-emitting feasible food production system, given general 
apathy or refusal to shift away from a meat or dairy diet. Must the principled vegan actively 
promote this? 
In practice, individuals will generally struggle to promote courses of action incompatible 
with their own deeply held moral values. With some exceptions, they are also likely to develop 
skillsets in line with their own interests. Thus, simply fulfilling the CPD as laid out would 
generally keep the individual’s actual decisions in line with Option (1). However, this chapter 
does not purport to resolve this final puzzle. I highlight it as yet another outstanding question 
in the literature around individual climate justice duties. It is to this literature that I hope more 
                                                     
25 As the previous section acknowledged, Anja Karnein (2014) rightly distinguishes the question of what duty-
bearers owe to the victims of climate change (and the demandingness of those duties) from that of what duty 
bearers owe to one another. However, where it is not a matter of one person ‘picking up the slack’ by rescuing 
an additional victim, but of many cooperating to forge long-term collective schemes which satisfy (ideally) 
both duties, it is necessary to take an explicit stand on whether it is legitimate to prioritise duties to victims.  
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broadly to have contributed, by focusing on what the individual can achieve not in isolation 
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